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RECENT DECISIONS
CREDITORS' RIGHTs-BuLK SAiEs-CLEARANcE SALF&.-Plaintiff trustee in bankruptcy, acting on behalf of creditors, sued to hold defendant accountable under the
New York Bulk Sales Act for the value of a batch of off-season shoes sold to defendant by the bankrupt. Three weeks before Christmas, 1948, the bankrupt had
opened a family shoe store. With the approach of spring his inventory had declined
but still consisted in part of fall and winter styles. To clear his shelves of the off-season
shoes as well as to obtain cash to pay debts and thus obtain credit for the purchase of
new summer stock, the bankrupt sold some thirteen hundred pairs of shoes to defendant, a dealer in leftover footwear. There was no discontinuance of any branch of the
bankrupt's business or of any line or brand of merchandise carried by him. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed a judgment of the Supreme Court, Special
Term, which had upheld a decision of the Official Referee to dismiss the complaint, and
directed defendant to account. On appeal, held, two judges dissenting, judgment reversed. The sale was in the ordinary course of trade and not within the scope of the
Bulk Sales Act. Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 305 N.Y. 235. 112 N.E. 2d 210 (1953).
Early in the current century bulk sales laws were enacted in most of the states.'
They protect creditors against a sale of the whole or large portion of a debtor's goods
by requiring the seller to list his creditors and requiring notice by the purchaser to such
creditors a specified number of days before possession is taken under such a sale.
The decision in the instant case had turned upon the following language of the New

York Bulk Sales Act: "The sale . . . in bulk of any part or the whole of a stock of
merchandise . . . pertaining to the conducting of the business of the seller...

otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regular prosecution of said
2 unless there is
business, shall be void as against the creditors of the seller, .
compliance with certain specified requirements. 3 Failure on the part of the purchaser
to conform to these requirements. shall, upon application of any of the seller's creditors,
*.."

1. The rapidity of the legislative movement is clearly reflected in the decisions of the New
York Court of Appeals. In Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 75 N.E. 404 (1905), the New York
Bulk Sales Law of 1902 was held unconstitutional as denying merchants the equal protection
of the laws as against other classes of persons. In Lemieuax v. Young, 211 U.S. 489 (1909),
and Kidd, Dater and Price Co. v. Musselman Grocer Co., 217 US. 461 (1910), such laws
were upheld under the federal constitution by the United States Supreme Court at the end
of that decade. Thereafter, in Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383, 114 N.E. S09 (1916), the
constitutionality of the New York Bulk Sales Law of 1914 was upheld, not on the basis of
trivial distinctions, but squarely on the ground that Wright v. Hart had become wrong. As
Judge Cardozo said, ". . . such laws . . . were thought in the prevailing opinion to represent
the fitful prejudices of the hour. . . . The fact is that they have come to stay, and like laws
may be found on the statute books of every, state."
2. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 44.
3. Among the conditions enumerated are these: (1) the seller must give the purchaser, at
least ten days before the sale, "a full and detailed inventory," showing the quantity and the
cost price of each article to be sold; (2) the purchaser must retain said inventory for at least
ninety days for inspection by any creditor of the seller; (3) the purchaser must obtain a list
of the names and addresses of such creditors, with the amount of the indebtedness owing to
each; and (4) the purchaser must notify personally or by registered mail every creditor of the
proposed sale, of its terms and conditions, at least ten days before he takes porscs on of or
pays for the merchandise involved.
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render him "a receiver . . . accountable to such creditors for all the goods . . . that
have come into his possession by virtue of such sale."
The majority of the court in the instant case reasoned that in the business of shoe
retailing the sale of off-season wares is no rare and irregular occurrence, but rather an
established operating pattern, with no attempt to defraud creditors. Such a sale is an
inevitable incident to the conduct of business. Creditors are forewarned by industry
and trade custom that off-season sales are regular occurrences and are entirely apart
from the Bulk Sales Act. Creditors may anticipate usual sales of obsolete leftovers and
scrutinize such transactions beforehand and, if fraud or covert advantage is later found,
a creditor may set it aside as a fraudulent conveyance under state law, 4 or under the
federal bankruptcy statute.r
The minority opinion argues, and it is submitted validly, that this sale was not in the
ordinary course of trade, and was, therefore, subject to the Bulk Sales Act. This
seller was not a wholesaler but the proprietor of a small retail shop. His ordinary course
of trade was selling shoes at retail to those who came into the store to buy from the
stock in trade for wear. The sale and delivery in a quick cash transaction to one buyer,
of about thirteen hundred pairs of shoes was just the sort of sale this statute deals with.
When this retail merchant made a sale of a substantial part of his stock, the impact of
the Bulk Sales Act was automatic.
While this is a case of first impression in the New York Court of Appeals, the matter
came before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Jubas v.
Sampsell,6 where an almost identical statute was applied to a similar sale by a retailer
of out of style shoes. The trustee in bankruptcy sought to recover the value of a sale
of shoes by the bankrupt to defendant, alleged to be void as to existing creditors of
the bankrupt. The court held that where the sale constituted 25 percent of the number
of pairs of shoes of the stock in trade of the bankrupt and seven days notice of intention was not recorded as required by the California Bulk Sales Law, the sale was void
as being outside the regular course of business. Similarly, in Irving Trust Co. v. Rosenwasser,7 there was a sale of off-season shoes. The bankrupt, who was operating three
retail shoe stores, sold 5,000 pairs of shoes to defendant, a dealer in leftover footwear.
The trustee in bankruptcy sued defendant for failure to comply with the New York
Bulk Sales Act. The federal district court did not think that by any fair construction
of the New York Bulk Sales Act the sale of these close-outs could be considered as
within the ordinary course of trade and the regular prosecution of the business.
Nonsalability of goods in the ordinary course of trade because of changes in style or
shopworn conditions, or the fact that the goods are largely odds and ends, present
pressing problems of turnover in the retail trade. Nevertheless, Bulk Sales Acts were
designed to prevent merchants from disposing of goods in a manner which is foreign
to the usual course of business. While judicial interpretation of the phrase, otherwiso
4. N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law §276.
5. 44 Stat. 662 (1926), 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1946).
6. 185 F. 2d 333 (9th Cir. 1950). See also Markwell and Co. v. Lynch, 114 F. 2d 373
(9th Cir. 1940), where an action was brought by trustee in bankruptcy to recover goods or
their value which were pledged by the bankrupt as security for a loan. The bankrupt conducted a retail jewelry store. He borrowed $300 and as security for the repayment of the loan
pledged certain of his stock in trade valued at $600. At the time of the pledge, the stock of
the bankrupt did not exceed the value of $9,500. In construing the California Bulk Sales
Act, the court held that the pledge by a retail merchant of a substantial part of his stock of
goods is a disposal of the goods out of the ordinary course of trade.
7. 5 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
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than in the ordinarycourse of trade and in the regularprosecutionof business,8 has not,

as to all sales, been uniform,9 sales in job lots to clear the shelves have been consistently held to have been made out of the ordinary course of business in the previous
cases where this problem has arisen,' 0 and this despite evidence of custom or usage of
merchants in a given line of business to make such sales, or, of the fact that similar
sales were made by a retailer in the past." When a storekeeper disposes of a substantial part of his stock in trade, and selling of a substantial part is not the usual and
ordinary way in which he conducts his business from day to day, the sale would seem
dearly to fall within the intent and purpose of the statute.12
The New York Debtor and Creditor Law, 13 and the Bankruptcy Act,1 4 are cited by
the court as furnishing an adequate remedy in providing for a speedy discovery of

assets and making a preference by an insolvent debtor an act of bankruptcy and voidable. These provisions may seem to furnish the creditors ample protection. As a
practical matter, what the average creditor wants most is not a legal remedy to be
administered subsequent to the sale of the debtor's assets, but notice in advance of the
proposed transfer, such as a bulk sales statute provides. If this notice is afforded him,
the creditor is, from a business standpoint at least, in a better position than if the
sale already has taken place, although his debtor at the time of the transfer may have
been technically insolvent.

I'suA cE-INsuRa.EBL. INTERE T-RiGET or PARENT CORPORATION TO RECoVER
UPON POLICY FOR Loss To SsmrBSiY CoRnoRAroN.-Plaintiff, an incorporated college, brought an action on a theft policy for loss sustained through burglary of the
8. This phrase is typical of bulk sales statutes found in other states. See Me. Rev. Stat. c.
106, § 6 (1944) ; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 11,102 (1926) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 7,283 (1938) ; Va.
Code Ann. § 55-83 (1950).
9. The judicial test adopted by some courts is whether the sale was made in the usual way
in which a merchant owing debts conducts his business, or whether he takes an unusual
method of disposing of his property to get the money for his own use leaving his creditors
unpaid. This inquiry is essentially an issue of fact depending upon the nature of the seller's
business, his ordinary method of making sales, and his indebtednoss. A sale of his entire stock
by one trader might not be uncommon, while such a sale if made by another would be
extraordinary and within the statute. Hart v. Brierly, 189 Mass. 598, 601, 76 N.E. 286
(1905). The cases also omit any reference to the seller's intention. One of the primary
purposes of bulk sales acts was to avoid predicating the creditors remedy on any such subtle
basis. This rationale was set forth in a decision involving the Oregon Bulk Sales Statute.
There a sale was held to have been made in the ordinary course of business although it was
conceded that the merchant had an intent to defraud his creditors. Sabin v. Hornstein, 260
Fed. 754 (9th Cir. 1919).
10. Irving Trust Co. v. Rosenwasser, 5 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Conquest v.
Atkins et al., 123 Mle. 327, 122 Ati. 858 (1923) ; Cohen v. Calhoun, 168 Miss. 34, 150 So. 193
(1933). See also Keller v. Fowler Bros. and Cox, 148 Tenn. 571, 256 S.W. 879 (1923), where
there was an attempt by the seller to establish the custom of selling any unprofitable store
in his grocery chain.
ii. Irving Trust Co. v. Rosenwasser, 5 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Keller v. Fowler
Bros. and Cox, 148 Tenn. 571, 256 S.W. 879 (1923).
12. See note 6 supra.
13. See note 4 supra.
14. See note 5 suDra.
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college store. The recovery was sought under a policy issued to the plaintiff covering
all direct loss caused by safe burglary or robbery occurring on the premises of the insured. The policy provided that the insured property might be owned by the insured
or held by him in any capacity. After the issuance of the policy the plaintiff created
a separate corporation, of which it was the sole stockholder, to operate the college
store. While the policy was in force the college store suffered a burglary loss in excess
of the $4,000 maximum of the policy. The defendant insurance company refused to
pay. Plaintiff's bill was demurred to by the defendant on two grounds, first, that the
policy covered only the plaintiff and no other person, and second, that the store was
a separate entity and hence no direct loss was suffered by the plaintiff. The lower court
overruled the defendant's demurrer. Upon appeal, held, one justice dissenting, affirmed.
The plaintiff had an insurable interest in the property stolen and could recover under
the burglary policy even though the property was owned by a corporate subsidiary.
American Indemnity Co. v. Southern Missionary College, 260 S.W.2d 269 (Tenn. 1953).
The opinions of the court in the case at bar raise fundamental questions of insurance
law. There seems to be no doubt that the plaintiff college has an insurable interest in
the property of the incorporated bookstore. Insurable interest has been defined as "Any
lawful and substantial economic interest in the safety or preservation of property from
loss, destruction or pecuniary damage." I The property insured must have some interest which is legally protectable.2 It is further recognized that while this insurable
interest must exist at the time of loss it is not necessary at the time the policy is procured, 3 provided there is4 a bona fide expectancy of acquiring such interest at the time
the policy was procured.
The interest of the plaintiff college as sole stockholder constitutes a sufficient insurable interest to support a contract of property insurance., The basis for such interest
is not the actual ownership of the property which is in the corporation0 but the stockholders' right to share in dividends of the corporation when declared and to share in
the corporate assets upon liquidation.7 That the interest of the plaintiff is substantial
is apparent from the fact that it is the sole stockholder of the subsidiary book store
which has the identical directors who serve the plaintiff.
As owner of the book store property when the policy was issued there is no question
1. N.Y. Ins. Law § 148; the New York statute is declarative of the common law In New
York and generally elsewhere. Harrison v. Fortlage, 161 U.S. 57 (1896); Conn. Mutual Life

Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876); Morrison v. Boston Ins. Co. et al., 234 Mass.
453, 125 N.E. 698 (1920); Cherokee Foundries Inc. v. Imperial Assurance Co., 188 Tenn.
349, 219 S.W. 2d 203 (1949).
2. Ruse v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 23 N.Y. 561 (1861); Manhattan Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Paul Tischman Co. et al., 203 Misc. 452, 118 N.Y. S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
3. Sun Ins. Co. v. Merz, 64 N.J.L. 301, 45 Ati. 785 (1900); Patterson, Essentials of
Insurance Law 105 (1953).
4. Vance on Insurance 181 (1951) ; Lucena v. Crafurd et al., 3 Bos. & Pul, 75 (1802);
Herkimer et al. v. Rice et al., 27 N.Y. 163 (1863).
5. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 161 Ala. 600, 50 So. 73 (1909); Riggs v. Commercial
Mutual Ins. Co., 125 N.Y. 7, 25 N.E. 1058 (1890); National Grocery Co. v. Katzebue Fur &
Trading Co., 3 Wash. 2d 288, 100 P.2d 408 (1940). Note, however, that in these cases all or
a substantial part of the stock was owned by the stockholder.
6. "The whole title to it [the corporate property] is in the corporation, and the shareholders are neither tenants in common nor in any legal sense the owners of It." United
States Radiator Corp. v. New York, 208 N.Y. 144, 152, 101 N.E. 783, 786 (1913).
7. Riggs v. Commercial Mutual Ins. Co., 125 N.Y. 7,25 N.E. 1058 (1890).
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of insurable interest when the policy was obtained. The difficulty which the plaintiff
encountered in attempting to recover was the fact that its interest was not specifically
set forth when the policy was issued nor was it subsequently clarified. Insurance is a
personal contract and the person or corporation to be indemnified must be named or
sufficiently identified in the contract.8 Accordingly, reformation of a fire policy has
been denied when an individual proprietor took out a policy in his firm's name but
neglected to inform the insurer of the subsequent incorporation of the firm.0 An even
stricter view was expressed in the case of Geiger Watch Case Corp. v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. 10 where reformation was again denied to an individual who mistakenly
took out the policy in his own name but actually intended to cover the property of his
solely owned corporation -which was then in existence. The court in that case reasoned
that the insurer at no time contemplated the corporation as the other party to the
indemnity contract. If someone other than the party is intended to be covered, the
policy must dearly indicate this fact."
For a recovery under a burglary policy it is necessary that the property to be insured
be included in the terms of the policy. In Tischendorf v. Lynn Mutual Fire Ins. Co.' 2
the court held that mere existence of an insurable interest is not sufficient of itelf to
necessitate coverage of such interest. In the instant case, when the policy was issued,
the corporation which suffered the loss was not even in existence and as a result its
property could hardly be described in the policy.
The policy covered only direct loss to the college on property held in any capacity.' 3
There was no direct loss to the college here since title to the stolen property was in the
separate- corporation and it alone sustained the direct loss in the impairment of its
capital to this amount. The college, however, since it was the sole stockholder of the
bookstore corporation did as a matter of fact sustain an indirect loss.
In the instant case the majority concluded that the interest of the plaintiff was sufficiently described since the policy provided that the coverage included property owned
by the plaintiff or held by it "in any capacity." 14 Moreover there is no limitation in
this policy which appears in other policies that the insured be the "sole and unconditional" owner. 1 5 The majority of the court urged that property held by a wholly owned
subsidiary was held in some capacity by the plaintiff as sole stockholder and here
permitted a recovery. The separate corporate entities were treated as a "mere fiction
of the law." 16
8. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Barnes-Manley Wet Wash Laundry Co. et al., 163 F.2d 381
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 859 (1948) (for account of whom it may concern);
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. et al. v. Newton, 37 Ga. App. 70, 139 S.E. 365 (1927)
(to insured's executor or administrator); Foster et al. v. United States Ins. Co., 28 Mass. 85
(1831) (for owners of vessel).
9. New England Box & Barrel Co. v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 63 RI. 31S, 8 A.2d 805
(1939).
10. 120 Misc. 441, 199 N.Y. Supp. 555 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
11. Hartigan et al. v. Casualty Co. of America, 227 N.Y. 175, 124 N.E. 789 (1919);
Stanley v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 34 RI. 491, 84 At. 601 (1912).
12.

190 Wisc. 33, 208 N.W. 917 (1926).

13. American Indemnity Co. v. Southern Missionary College, 260 S.W.2d 269, 275 (Tenn.
1953).

14. Id. at 274.
15. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Hilliard et al., 59 Fla. 590, 52 So. 799 (1910); 4 Couch, Insurance
3178 (1929).
16. American Indemnity Co. v. Southern AMissionary College, 260 S.W.2d 269, 272 (Tenn.
1953).
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The dissenting opinion while not disputing the plaintiff's insurable interest, would
deny a recovery on the ground that the policy in the instant case provides indemnity
only for "all direct loss." 17 The only direct loss here was to the subsidiary and not
the plaintiff. Perhaps the solution to the question of interpretation is to resolve any
ambiguity against the company which prepared the policy. 18 It would seem that limiting recovery of the insured to "direct loss" but extending coverage to property held
by the insured "in any capacity" could result in inconsistent interpretations with the
insurance company properly suffering from its poor selection of language. However,
the dissent does raise a further question not so easily disposed of. Assuming coverage,
should the plaintiff be compensated as though it were the owner or only to the extent
of its interest as a stockholder? The burglary policy is a contract of indemnity,' 9 and
granting that a recovery is permissible, it is submitted that plaintiff should have recovered only to the extent of the injury sustained.20 This recovery should be measured
by the effect upon its right to possible later dividends or upon its right to participate
in the assets upon dissolution after creditors have been paid. 2' The majority opinion,
treating the plaintiff as the insured and the owner of the property, permitted a full
recovery.
The college was operating the bookstore when the policy was issued. No greater risk
or additional property was involved than originally contemplated. The only intervening
circumstance was the separate incorporation of the college store which changed the
title to the property. These factors undoubtedly influenced the court in arriving at an
"equitable result" at the expense of possible infringement upon settled principles of
insurance law.

LABoR

RELATIONS-LOCKOUT

BY

MULTI-EMPLOYER AssocIATIoN-UNFAIR

LABOR

PrcTicEs.-A single union composed of all the employees of eleven furniture dealers
was engaged in active negotiations with the dealers, the latter belonging to a multiemployer association. While the negotiations were pending the union by a vote of the
employees called a strike which was followed by cessation of work by the employees
of one dealer. The latter cdmpany was at the time complying with all the provisions of
the then existing contract. The union leader called the strike on the particular dealer
as the beginning of an announced "whipsawing process" against one after another of
the remaining ten, which could well result in strikes against all the dealers. To meet
this economic coercion the remaining dealers temporarily locked out all their employees
without discharging them. The furniture dealers petitioned the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit to set aside the order of the National Labor Relations Board, which bad
held the employer's conduct to be an unfair labor practice in that the employer had
resorted to interference, coercion and discrimination in violation of the employees'
rights guaranteed under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Held, enforce17. Id. at 275.
18. National Bank v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 95 U.S. 673 (1877) ; Hartol Products Corp.
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 290 N.Y. 44, 47 N.E. 2d 687 (1943); National Bank of Commerce v.

New York Life Ins. Co., 181 Tenn. 299, 181 S.W.2d 151 (1944).
19. Oppenheim v. Baker & Williams et al., 225 App. Div. 58, 232 N.Y. Supp. 5 (1st Dep't
1928).
20. Harrington v. Agriculture Ins. Co. et al., 179 Minn. 510, 229 N.W. 792 (1930) ; Beckman et al. v. Farmer's Mutual Fire Ins. Assoc., 66 App. Div. 72, 73 N.Y. Supp. 110 (3d
Dep't 1901).
21. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 161 Ala. 600, 50 So. 73 (1909).
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ment denied. The employer had neither discriminated against the employees nor failed
to bargain collectively. Leonard et al. v. N.L.R.B., 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953).
Employees have the right under the Taft-Hartley Law' to organize, to form, join or
assist labor organizations and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection and it is an unfair labor
practice to interfere with, coerce or restrain employees in the aforementioned rights
or to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization. Furthermore, if the employer discriminates against an employee in regard to
employment or discourages membership in any labor organization, he will be held to
have violated the statute.
A lockout is a cessation of the furnishing of work to the employees in an effort by
the employer to attain more desirable terms.2 In addition, it has been categorized as
a means of coercion, used against employees. 3 The second circuit has held that a lockout by the employer, not caused by economic reasons, is unlawful when used to defeat
the efforts of employees to unionize the plant.4 Threats by the employer that the
plant would be closed down if the employees did not abandon a strike have also been
held to be unlawful. 5 Similarly held to be violative were statements by the company's
president that the company was unable to pay higher wages and would shut down if
pressed too hard by the union.6
However, it should be noted that all lockouts are not violations of the Act. Circumstantial factors govern their validity. The National Labor Relations Board, under both
the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, has held that in certain instances a lockout is not
an unfair labor practice. For example, where a threatened strike against employers
would result in a spoilage of materials, the employers were entitled to guard against
such loss by locking out their employees in anticipation of the strike. 7 In another
case,8 it was held that the union's refusal to tell employers when the threatened strike
would occur warranted the refusal of the employers to accept further orders and to
lock out their employees, since the employers' purpose was to guard against disappointing customers. Lockouts are permitted in order that the employer may guard against
economic loss,9 or protect his legitimate interests.' 0 The Board refused to condemn
1. 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C.A. 157 et seq(1947) (Labor Management Relations Act).
2. Iron Mfolder's Union et al. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir. 1903).
3. Panzieri-Hogan Co. v. Bender, 205 App. Div. 39S, 401, 199 N.Y. Supp. 887, 889 (3rd
Dep't 1923) ; Agostini et al. v. State, 40 N.Y.S.2d 598, 605 (Ct. Cl. 1943).
4. N.L.R.B. v. Somerset Classics, Inc. et al., 193 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied
sub nom, Modern Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B. et al., 344 US. 816 (1952).
5. The Cuffman Lumber Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 296 (1949).
6. N.L.R.B. v. Faultless Caster Corp., 135 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1943); cf. Pacific Lumber
Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 1145 (1943).
7. Duluth Bottling Ass'n. et al., 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
8. Betts-Cadiliac, Olds, Inc. et al., 96 N.L.R.B. 268, 286 (1951). "An employer is not
prohibited from taking reasonable measures, including closing down his plant, where such
measures are, under the circumstances, necessary for the avoidance of economic loss or
business disruption attendant upon a strike. This right may, under some circumstances,
embrace the curtailment of operations before the precise moment the strike has occurred. ...
The nature of the measures taken, the objective, the timing, the reality of the strike threat,
the nature and extent of the anticipated disruption, and the degree of resultant restriction
on the effectiveness of concerted activity, are all matters to be weighed...
9. International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907(1951) (recurrent work stoppages which would
make further operations uneconomical).
10. Link-Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227 (1940) (Fear of a sit-down strike, and prevention of
supervisor from entering the plant).
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a lockout where the employer had no way of knowing how long the strike will last and
it was not economically feasible to operate the plant.11 In all of these cases the
employers' actions did not constitute an unfair labor practice, since they had neither
discriminated against their employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment nor
failed to bargain collectively.12
In the recent case of Morand Bros. Beverage Co. et al. v. N.L.R.B., 1 s the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the validity of lockouts where there was
economic necessity. The court then asserted: "present a bargaining impasse, the lockout would be justified as the assertion of the employer's corollary to the union's
right to strike, absent of course, affirmative proof of unlawful intent." In other words
employers were held to have the right to counter a strike's effectiveness by laying off,
suspending or locking out the employees who were members of the striking union and
with whom there was not then in effect any collective bargaining agreement. The court
was of the opinion that a legitimate lockout should be recognized as the employer's
means of exerting economic pressure on the union, a corollary to the union's right to
strike. Basing its decision on sections 208 (a) (ii) and 8 (d) (4) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,14 and its legislative history,15 the court recognized an
implied equality between strikes and lockouts.
In the instant case the court refused to join with the Board in the latter's condemnation of the lockout in question by holding that the announced "whipsawing process"
against one after another of the remaining dealers would have the effect of producing
uncertainty in the remaining dealers. Hence, none could feel safe in taking orders from
customers or placing orders for furniture with manufacturers, which might remain as
depreciating overstocked inventories. The court said that the Board had completely
overlooked the effect of the "whipsawing process," that in effect it had reversed its
former position that an employer faced with a threatened strike may lawfully lockout
employees if his motive in doing so is to protect his own economic interests, and that
it had avoided a significant point by ignoring the purpose of the Labor Management
11. Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199 (Sept. 29, 1953).
12. It is interesting to note, that while the court in the instant case held that sections
8(a) (3) of the Labor Management Relations Act (dealing with discrimination by the
employer in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment) and 8(a)(5) (compelling the employer to bargain collectively) were not violated,
nowhere does the court hold that section 8(a)(1) (making it an unfair labor practice for
the employer to interfere, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to
engage in concerted activities) has not been violated. The National Labor Relations Board
held the employers' action violative of the latter section. Just because there is not a violation
of 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (5) does not lead to the conclusion that 8(a) (1) has not been violated.
It is only indicative of the fact that usually unions do not make charges under 8(a) (1) until
the act takes the form of some drastic overt act, such as a discharge or discrimination. It
would seem to follow from this that unless we were to consider section 8(a) (1) as mere
verbiage, there could be a violation of that section without a violation of the other sections.
National Labor Relations First Annual Report 71 (1936). Seas Shipping Co., Inc., 4 N.L.R.B.
757 (1938).
13. 204 F.2d 529, 533 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
14. 61 Stat. 155, 29 U.S.C.A. 178 (a) (ii) and 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C.A. 158 (d) (4) (1947).
15. 2 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act 1206 (1947). Senator
Taft said "... what I consider to be the basic theory of the entire bill, that is, an attempt
to create equality between employer and employee. . . ." and at p. 483 "Clearly a strike or
lockout during the 60-day period would constitute an unfair labor practice."
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Relations Act to create equality in the economic struggle between employer and employee. This conclusion follows the reasoning and implications of the decision in the
Morand Bros. case.
The position taken by the court with regard to the protection of the employers'
economic interests appears to be tenable, because of the devastating effect which the
"whipsawing process" could have on the employers' business. To the extent, however,
that the court intimates that a lockout, absent economic necessity, is not an act of
interference the court's opinion appears to be questionable. One of the most subtle
ways of interfering with the employees' right to organize is by an act tending to lower
the employees' morale.18 The broad language of the Act seems to proscribe both
permanent and temporary lockouts, and since the courts have held that permanent
discharges are violations of the Act, 17 the same should be true of temporary suspensions
of work. The only significant difference is that in the former the employee loses his
seniority and must reapply for work, whereas in the latter he loses only his wages.
Analyzing the premise that a strike and a lockout are impliedly equated in section
208(a) (ii), which deals with the issuance of an injunction enjoining a strike or lockout
which will imperil the national health or safety, it seems apparent that the sole concern
of Congress in enacting that section was to discourage resort to self-help by both the
employer and union during the 60 day period.' 8 That section was intended to refer
to a legal strike or lockout since illegal strikes and lockouts may be enjoined without
resort to that section. Consequently it would appear that the Act does not sanction
all lockouts, especially when the purpose and necessary effect of the employers' conduct
is to interfere with the rights of the employees protected under the Act. The better
view would appear to be that the Act in prescribing unfair labor practices for a labor
organization' 9 has fulfilled the announced purpose of the Act to create equality between
the employer and employee. There is no sound reason to hold that the power to lockout
is also necessary to equate both sides of the bargaining table.

SAEs-ESTOPPEL--SALE BY A PERSON NOT THE OwNER.-The defendant and an

auctioneer in New Jersey had maintained a regular course of dealings whereby jewelry
was entrusted to the auctioneer with memoranda indicating that there was no authority
to sell; exhibitions were permitted but only to solicit offers. On numerous occasions
the defendant had approved such unauthorized sales but continued the practice of
entrusting jewelry with the same limited authority. The plaintiff purchased a diamond
from the auctioneer, which had been entrusted to him under similar circumstances and
which, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the defendant, had been displayed for
over a month with other goods properly up for sale. Very shortly thereafter the auctioneer went into bankruptcy. The plaintiff brought an action for a declaratory judgment to establish her claim of ownership. The defendant counterclaimed in repleviln
The Supreme Court, Special Term, in the exercise of discretion refused to render a
declaratory judgment but entered judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant on
the latter's counterclaim. The Appellate Division reversed. On appeal to the Court of
16. Brown Shoe Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 803 (1936).
17. Shell Oil Co. v. N.I.R.B, 196 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1952); Law et al. v. N.L.R.B., 192
F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1951).
18. Morand Bros. Beverage Co. et al., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952).
19. 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C.A. 158 (a) (1) et seq. (1947).
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Appeals, held, judgment reversed. Under the Sales Act the defendant was estopped
from asserting his title against plaintiff. Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y.
180, 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953).
The facts in the instant case might have supported the conclusion that an actual implied in fact agency to sell had existed between the defendant and the auctioneer.' The
numerous approvals of prior sales might well have fostered the conclusion that the
memorandum was a sham, 2 and the lack of intent to comply with the terms of the
instrument can be shown by parol evidence. 3 The court, however, did not place its
decision on this ground, but invoked the doctrine of estoppel under the Uniform Sales
4
Act.
The common law has always protected the owner's title to his chattels and he is
seldom held to be estopped when he entrusts his goods to one who subsequently sells
them without authorization. The mere transfer of possession does not preclude the
owner's recovery from an innocent purchaser. 5 Likewise, the fact that the owner has entrusted the goods to one who deals in similar merchandise affords no protection to the
buyer, who is held to be bound to make inquiries as to the seller's authority. 0 Thus,
in Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Decker et al., 7 certain cars were mortgaged to a bank.
The dealer retained possession and continued displaying them with the bank's full
approval. The dealer sold two cars without authority from the bank. The court permitted the bank to recover, asserting that, the display notwithstanding, there were no
grounds to invoke an estoppel. Likewise in Smith v. Clews et al. 8 a jewelry broker took
possession of a diamond with his authority limited to the procuring of offers. He subsequently sold it. In holding for the owner the court said that mere possession had
never been held to confer a power of sale, and that an unauthorized sale vests no better
1. It should be noted that the decision is not necessarily the law of New York. The
court is interpreting the law of New Jersey where the transaction occurred.
2. Weed v. Carpenter, 4 Wend. 219 (N.Y. 1830).
3. Nelkin v. Provident Loan Society, 265 N.Y. 393, 193 N.E. 245 (1934).
4. Uniform Sales Act § 23: ". . . where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner
thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the
buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller, unless the owner of the goods Is
by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell." N.Y. Pers. Prop, Law
§ 104 and N.J.S.A. 46:30-29 are worded identically.
5. Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N.Y. 314 (1869).
6. "The purchaser buys at his risk of the title, and if he would be safe, must make
inquiry. He may not, with certainty, stop at the fact of possession, but must learn how the
possession has been acquired." Farmer's Bank v. Logan, 74 N.Y. 568, 586 (1878). The law of
market overt, recognized in England, gives validity to any transaction purportedly passing
title to goods and which is entered into in the open market, as set apart by custom. Market
overt, however, has not been adopted in this country. 2 Bouv. Law Dict. 2095 (3rd Rev. ed.) ;
see Wheelright v. Despester, 1 Johns. 471 (N.Y. 1806). For a criticism of the present American law on the point See Waite, Caveat Emptor and the Judicial Process, 25 Col. L.R. 129
(1925).
7. 244 N.Y. 340, 155 N.E. 665 (1927). Contra: Carter v. Rowley, 59 Cal. App. 486, 211
Pac. 267 (1922).
8. 114 N.Y. 190, 21 N.E. 160 (1889). Memorandum evidencing the transaction contained
the words "on approval." In the trade this was construed to confer no power of sale. Thus,
parol evidence was admissible to define the terms of the agreement, and, consequently, the
rights of the parties.
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title in the vendee than was possessed by the vendor. The courts will find an estoppel,
however, when, in addition to possession, indicia of ownership accompany the transfer,
and there is reliance thereon. 9 In the instant controversy the Appellate Division had
held the principle of the Utica case prevailed. However, the Court of Appeals distinguished that case on two grounds, namely, that in the Utica case no proof was offered
to show any prior violations of the mortgage agreement, and, secondly, that such mortgage was filed publicly.
The distinctions offered by the court are questionable. The first distinction, based
on the prior approvals, is inapposite. Since the estoppel doctrine has always depended
upon the element of reliance to sustain its application, 10 the prior approvals of unauthorized sales can have no significance unless the buyer knew of them and relied upon
them. In the case at bar, the plaintiff, unaware of the circumstances that edsted prior
to the purchase at the auction gallery, could not possibly possess the knowledge necessary for the reliance.
The court's second distinction is equally questionable. In the case at bar, the defendant made no efforts to inform the public that the exhibition was permitted for the
sole purpose of soliciting offers. In the Utica case, this court argued the recording
fulfilled this requirement. Constructive notice, however, was not the crucial question
in the Utica case. There the mortgage had been filed under the wrong statute, and,
therefore, the filing did not serve as constructive notice to subsequent purchasers; as
to them the mortgage was void. 1 The court held the mortgage valid despite the improper filing, and sustained the mortgagee's rights, refusing to invoke estoppel on the
basis of the permitted display. Constructive notice was not alluded to, nor was it
considered as a basis for the decision.' 2
As a consequence, the court in the instant case by seizing on this last factor is imposing an obligation on an owner publicly to discountenance any misleading situations for
which he is responsible. Heretofore, this duty was exacted, as to persons in similar
situations, by virtue of statutory requirements; the obligation was not one of judicial
compulsion.' 3 The effect of this decision is to change the object of the purchaser's
9. Voorhis et al. v. Olistead et al., 66 N.Y. 113 (1876), (owner entrusted another with
possession of warehouse receipts); O'Connor v. Clark, 170 Pa. 318, 32 Atl. 1029 (1895),
(bailor permitted bailee's name to be painted on the side of the wagon bailed).
10. Barnard et al. v. Campbell et aL, 55 N.Y. 456 (1874). "... it is obvious that the
doctrine can apply only in those cases in which this element of reliance vas present."
Mechem, Law of Agency § 724 (2d ed. 1914). See 2 Williston on Sales § 312 (Rev. ed.
1948).
11. N.Y. lien Law § 230 states that the mortgage must be filed or it is void as against
innocent purchasers. N.Y. Pers. Prop. § 45 states that mortgages covering repayment of loans
or advances shall not be void or presumed fraudulent as against innocent purchasers by reason
of want of possession of the merchandise on the part of the lienor, provided a sign is posted
on the premises. The plaintiff in the Utica case had filed under § 230, he should have filed
under § 45. Thus, the question presented was whether the improper filing invalidated the
mortgage.
12. Some courts have refused to take cognizance of a filing as constructive notice of a
mortgage which covered the automobile purchased. "... the implied notice arising from
recording a mortgage is not enough as a matter of law to offset the inference of authority to
sell arising from the circumstances here found." Denno v. Standard Acceptance Corp., 277
Mass. 251, 178 N.E. 513, 515 (1931).
13. See note 6 supra.
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reliance 14 from indicia of ownership 1 to a public appearance of authority to sell,
where in fact there is none. 10 This is a marked relaxation of a rigid rule.
Nevertheless the result of the instant case may be sound. The inability of the public
to cope with deceptive situations, as herein presented, should relieve them of any detriment incurred as a result of the owner's responsibility in contributing to this deception.
This is in keeping with the theory of recent legislative enactments protecting the general
purchasing public." 7 The regretful aspect of the instant case, however, is the manner
in which the court reached their conclusion, inadvertently leaving the present status of
the New York law doubtful.' 8 Subsequently, if the judiciary fails to clarify its position, it will be a proper subject for appropriate action by the legislature. 1

TAxATION-INcoME TAX-TAAIILrrY OF PuZE WINNINS.--In June 1948 an automobile dealer in Louisville, Kentucky, advertised in the Louisville papers that a new
automobile would be exhibited at its showroom on June 18, 1948, that in conjunction
with this exhibition an automobile would be given away on that day, and that any one
who visited its showroom on that day would be eligible to participate in the drawing
for the car. The plaintiff, with some 27,000 others, responded to the advertisement,
visited the showroom, gave her name to an employee of the dealer in response to that
employee's request, and thus became eligible to participate in the contest. The plaintiff's name and address was marked on a card and placed in a large drum-like container.
Later the same day the card bearing plaintiff's name and address was selected from the
drum and she was declared the winner of the car. The dealer charged the value of the
car to advertising on its income tax return for the year 1948. The plaintiff in her income tax return for the year 1948 failed to include said car as taxable income. The
Commissioner assessed a deficiency against the plaintiff for her failure to include said
car as taxable income. Plaintiff brought this action to recover the amount paid under
the deficiency assessment. Held, judgment for plaintiff taxpayer. The automobile was
a gift and therefore not taxable. Bates v. Glenn, 114 F. Supp. 445 (W. D. Ky. 1953).
The problem before the court was whether the automobile received was taxable in-

14. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 43 (Factor's Act) circumvents the necessity for a reliance on
anything more than possession. The statute is predicated on a factor's actual authority to sell
or pledge; possession by such factors is conclusive evidence of ownership as to any subsequent
disposition of the goods. Freudenheim et al. v. Gutter et al., 201 N.Y. 94, 94 N.E. 640 (1911).
Parol evidence is admissible to show a memorandum does not represent the true agreement.
Nelkin v. Provident Loan Society, 265 N.Y. 393, 193 N.E. 245, (1934).
15. See note 9 supra.
16. Agency by estoppel is an artificial agency imposed by the courts when a person willfully or negligently creates a false impression that a certain fact exists, when in truth It does
not exist. See Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 Yale L.J. 859 (1920).
17. See, for example, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § g0 (Uniform Trust Receipts Act) which
protects innocent purchasers for new value in the regular course of business; and N.Y. Lien
Law § 230, covering chattel mortgages of motor vehicles, equally protects innocent purchasers
in the regular course of business. The latter statute avoids the precise situation of the Utica
case, but the estoppel principle of that case is still valid.
18. Note that the instant case is a dictum insofar as it controls the law of New York; see
note 1 supra.
19. A notable example would be the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that any
entrusting of goods to a merchant dealing in similar goods will empower him to transfer the
rights of the entruster. Proposed Uniform Commercial Code § 2-403(2) (Official Draft 1951).
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come under Section 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code,' or a gift exempt from taxation by Section 22 (b) (3).2
The first ruling by the Internal Revenue Bureau relating to the taxability of prize
winnings was enunciated in 1923. 3 The Bureau declared that a prize won by a contestant in a newspaper contest was taxable income, since it was paid in consideration of
the winner's compliance with the conditions of the contest which aided the newspaper
in its scheme of advertising. Later, in 1929, the Bureau distinguished recognition awards
from competitive prizes and ruled that awards made by a foundation in recognition of
scientific achievements or for services in promoting the public welfare were gifts, and
not taxable income.4
The problem first reached the courts in 1945. In that year two cases v.ere decided
which showed scant consideration for the Bureau's viewpoint. In the first, Pauline C.
Washburn; the petitioner was informed by telephone that she had won $900 on the
"Pot 0' Gold" radio program. Those conducting the program had selected petitioner's
name by chance from a telephone directory. Petitioner was not required to submit her
name to the program, nor to be present at the radio studio to be eligible to receive the
money. The prize was given to her merely for answering the telephone. The petitioner
failed to declare the $900 as taxable income and the Commissioner assessed a deficiency
against her. The Tax Court upheld her contention that the money was a gift. The
money, said the court, "was not a gain from capital, . . . nor from labor, . .. nor
from both combined. It came to petitioner without expectation or effort. It was not
the result of a wager. The receipt of the payment involved no subsequent obligation
on petitioner's part and petitioner in no wise undertook to justify the payment. .. ." 0
In the other case, McDermott v. Commissioner,7 the recipient of the Ross Essay prize
was held to have received a non-taxable gift. The circuit court in its decision emphasized the donative intent of the sponsor in making the award, the purpose of the contest, and the entire lack of profit to be derived by the sponsor from the contest.8 The
Bureau subsequently published a ruling in which it stated that it did not agree with
the court's holding, and that in the future it would consider the winner of the Ross
Essay prize to have received taxable income. 9
Five years after the McDermott decision the problem was again presented to the
Tax Court. Deficiency assessments were appealed from by two essay prize winners. 10
In both cases the court drew a fine distinction between the case before it and the
McDermott case, on the grounds that petitioner had not shown a clear donative intent
on the contest sponsor's part, nor a complete absence of benefit to the sponsor in mak1. Lnt. Rev. Code § 22 (a). "'Gross income' includes gains, profits, and income derived
from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service ... and income derived from
any source whatever."
2. Int. Rev. Code § 22 (b). "Exclusion from gross income. The following items shall not
be included in groqs income and shall be exempt from taxation .... (3) Gifts, bequests,
devises, and inheritances. The value of property acquired by gift ..
3. I.T. 1651, 11-1 Cum. Bull. 68 (1923).
4. G.C.M. 5881, VIII-1 Cum. Bull. 68 (1929).
5. 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
6. Id. at 1335.
7. 150 F. 2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
8. Id. at 587-588.
9. IT. 3960, 1949-2 Cum. Bull. 13.
10. Herbert Stein, 14 T.C. 494 (1950); Frederick V. Waugh, 19 T.C. Mem. Dec. § 50,095
(1950).
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ing the award. In one of the cases the court went further and stated that in the
McDermott case "too much importance was placed on the question whether the original
furnisher of the money intended to make a gift and too little attention was paid to the
question whether there was as to the recipient gain or compensation from labor or work
at a business or profession." 11 In that same year the Bureau reiterated its earlier
position in relation to the taxability of prize winnings, ruling that, "It is the position
of the Bureau that when an individual takes part in a contest, complies with the conditions thereof, and as a result wins a prize, he derives taxable income ..
." 12
In 1952 the problem was finally considered by the Supreme Court. In Robertson v.
United States13 the Court was asked to decide whether a prize won by a participant
in an essay contest was taxable income or not. In supporting the Commissioner, the
Court held that the payment to a winner is the discharge of a legal obligation, and that
the "acceptance by the contestant of the offer tendered created an enforceable contract."
The Court stated, "The discharge of legal obligations-the payment for services rendered or consideration paid pursuant to a contract-is in no sense a gift. The case
would be different if an award were made in recognition of past achievements or present abilities, or if payment were not given for services . . . , but out of affection, respect, charity or like impulses. When the payment is in return for services rendered,
it is irrelevant that the donor derives no economic benefit from it." 14 This holding was
followed in Amerikian v. United States,15 and appears clearly to have impliedly repudiated McDermott v. Commissioner.16
The instant case is concerned with the degree of participation in a contest or drawing by a prize winner which will characterize the prize as a payment in discharge of a
legal liability rather than that of a mere gratuity. In the Robertson case the effort
expended by the winner in composing and submitting his literary work clearly afforded
sufficient consideration to support the tendered prize. 17 . In Pauline C. Washburn it is
just as clear that no such consideration existed.' 8 Where between these two cases will
the line distinguishing gift from income be drawn?
The Bureau has long since stated its position. In a ruling governing a situation in
which the prize winner did even less than the petitioner in the case under review, it held
that the recipient of an automobile, awarded by a restaurant to the holder of a certain
ticket distributed to him gratuitously with his meal, received taxable income. 19 The
court in the instant case has, nevertheless, drawn the line by extending the holding in
Pauline C. Washburn.
The facts of the principal case, however, clearly distinguish it from Pauline C. Washburn. In the latter case no active measures were taken by the petitioner to enable her
to be eligible to receive the prize. Petitioner was not required to take any action to fulfill any conditions, nor make any application as a requisite for eligibility. She did not
11. Herbert Stein, 14 T.C. 494, 501 (1950).
12. I.T. 3987, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 9.
13. 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
14. Id. at 713.
15. 197 F. 2d 442 (4th Cir. 1952). This holding reversed a lower court holding in 100 F.
Supp. 263 (D. Md. 1951) which had been based on McDermott v. Commissioner, and which
had stated that the McDermott decision laid down the general rule as to the taxability of
essay prize winnings.
16. Note, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 152 (1954).
17. Ibid.
18. Mintz, "Pot 0' Gold" in the Tax Court, 24 Taxes 940 (1946).
19. I.T. 1667, I-1 Cum. Bull. 83 (1923).
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even know of the existence of the offer. In the case before the court, however, plaintiff
knew of the outstanding offer and visited the showroom in response to the advertisement in the newspaper. Once there she submitted her name to the dealer knowing that
it was to be placed in the drum from which the name of the eventual winner would be
picked. By these actions plaintiff took affirmative steps, with the offer in mind, to fulfill the conditions requisite for her participation in the drawing, and to give the consideration requested by the dealer.20 Plaintiff's induced attendance was exactly what
the dealer sought to accomplish by making its offer.
The holding seems, furthermore, irreconcilable with contract law as announced in
Maugks v. Porter,'
a case almost identical factually with it. There an automobile
was offered as a prize to induce people to attend an auction. The only requirement to
be eligible to participate in the drawing for the car was attendance at the auction. The
court, while ruling that the eventual winner could not enforce the contract with the
auctioneer because the drawing was a lottery and violative of public policy, nevertheless
stated that attendance by the winner at the auction would have been sufficient consideration to support the auctioneer's promise if no violation of public policy had been
involved. The Government does not concern itself with whether the income is the result of a legal or illegal transaction in determining taxable income, but applies the same
rules to income derived from either source. 22

TORTs-FEDERAL TORT CLA is AcT-THE GoVERNMENT's RIGrT To ImD-WNIrx
AGAINST ITS EMPLOYEE.-Judgment was recovered against the United States under

the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries arising from a collision in California between
plaintiff's automobile and a Government vehicle. The United States District Court
then gave judgment over in favor of the United States against the driver of the Government vehicle who had been impleaded as a third party defendant. On appeal, held,
one judge dissenting, judgment reversed. The United States is not entitled to indemnification from its negligent employee. Gilman v. Udted States et al., 206 F. 2d 846 (9th
Cir. 1953).
The Federal Tort Claims Act' constitutes a waiver of Governmental immunity from
suit for torts resulting from the negligence of Government employees, with the
exception of certain classes of claims specifically enumerated therein. This case is the
first involving the question of the Government's right to recover over against a negligent employee the amount of a judgment suffered under this statute.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was based principally upon that part of the
Tort Claims Act which provides: "The judgment in an action under Section 1346 (b)
of this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of
the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." 2 The majority opinion concludes that the Government's
right of indemnity was based upon the quasi-contractual principle of unjust enrichment,
and since the employee's obligation to the claimant was erased by the statute upon
20. See Restatement, Contracts § 53 (1932); Corbin on Contracts § 59 (1950).
21. 157 Va. 415, 161 S.E. 242 (1931).
22. United States v. Sullivan, 274 US. 259 (1927); James P. McKenna, 1 B.T.A. 326
(1925)

; Geller and Rogers, How the Federal Income Taxation Applies to Illegal and Unlawful

Gains, 27 Taxes 214 (1949).
1. 62 Star.984,28U.S.C.A. § 2676 (1948).
2. 62 Stat. 984,28 U.S.C.A. § 2676 (1948).
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entry of judgment under Section 1346 (b), 8 no cause of action arose in favor of the
Government. When the Government paid the judgment it was not paying something
which the employee ought to have paid since any obligation on his part had been completely wiped out. The dissenting opinion argues that Section 1346 (b) and Section
2674 4 of the Tort Claims Act indicate an intention on the part of the United States to
assume a liability measured by that of a private individual under like circumstances and
that these sections militate against any result which waives the Government's right
to sue.
Under the general common law5 and under California law0 an employer has a cause
of action against an employee to recover the amount of any judgment obtained against
the former as a result of the latter's negligence. The right to indemnity in such a case
is not limited to actions by employers against employees but extends to all those liable
for consequences flowing from the negligence of another, where the person who is liable
was not an active participant in the wrongful conduct.7 It is based upon the principle
that everyone is ultimately responsible for the consequences of his own negligence.8
This indemnity principle is a broad one and applies to any situation where there is
such inequality between the delinquency of those liable as to constitute one an active
wrongdoer and the other passive. 9 The search is for the "ultimate ethical culprit." 10
Privity of contract is not necessary for indemnification. The liability of the active
12
tort-feasor has been held to be quasi-contractual, 11 implied by the common law.
3.

62 Stat. 933, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1948)

".

.

. the District Court ...

shall have

exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages,
.. . under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
4. 62 Stat. 983, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1948) "The United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances .... "
5. Smith et al. v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875); Grand Trunk R.R. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177
(1874); Fedden v. B'klyn Eastern Dist. Term., 204 App. Div. 741, 199 N.Y. Supp. 9 (2d
Dep't 1923) ; Prosser on Torts 114 (1941) ; Restatement, Agency § 401, comment (c) (1933).
6. Myers v. Tranquility Irrigation District, 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P. 2d 419 (1938);
Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420, 97 Pac. 875 (1908).

7. Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1895); Tipaldl v.
Riverside Memorial Chapel et al., 273 App. Div. 414, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 12 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd,
298 N.Y. 686, 82 N.E. 2d 585 (1948).

8. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espagnola, 134 N.Y. 461,
31 N.E. 987 (1892).

9. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espagnola, supra note 8;
Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Const. Corp., 263 App. Div. 631, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 220 (Ist Dep't
1942), aff'd, 290 N.Y. 145, 48 N.E. 2d 299 (1943); Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Creem et al.,
102 App. Div. 354, 92 N.Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dep't 1905), aff'd without opinion, 185 N.Y. 580,
78 N.E. 1110 (1906). The latest pronouncement by the New York Court of Appeals emphasizes that a fault of omission as well as one of commission may constitute active negligence

and that the test depends upon the "factual disparity between the delinquency" of the two
tort-feasors. McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 330, 107 N.E. 2d 465,
472 (1952).

10. See Meriam and Thornton, Indemnity Between Tort-Feasors: An Evolving Doctrine
in the New York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 845, 860 (1950).
11. Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Const. Corp., supra note 9.
12. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. United States, 182 F. 2d 149, (8th Cir. 1950);
Brown v. Rosenbaum, 287 N.Y. 510, 41 N.E. 2d 77 (1942).
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Where the circumstances are such that a promise to reimburse cannot be implied in

3
fact, the obligation may be based upon quasi-contractual principles.1 However, the
right of recovery over by an employer held liable upon the principle of respondeat
superior arises not only by quasi-contract, but may also be based upon the breach of an
independent duty owing to him by the employee to use reasonable skill, care and judgment in the exercise of the duties of employment.' 4 Under this rule the Government
would have an adequate legal basis for recovery in the instant case.
There would seem to be no justification for the contention that the provision of the
Tort Claims Act barring the claimant from further action against an employee of the
Government upon judgment against the United States was designed to eliminate the
employee's liability for indemnity. An analysis of this section gives no evidence of
Congressional intent thus to release the employee from liability. There is nothing in
the Act prohibiting the claimant from bringing the original suit against the actual tortfeasor. The provision that judgment against the Government precludes further action
by the claimant against the employee is merely a statutory declaration of the law prevailing in many United States jurisdictions today' 5 since judgment for or against a
master in an action based upon the servant's tort is generally held a bar to an action by
the claimant against the servant.' 6 Moreover, since the solvency of the United States
is presumably unquestionable, it would be pointless to allow a cause of action to survive
entry of a judgment against the Government.' 7
The Government's right of indemnity against the employee does not arise until the
Government is cast in judgment. Thereafter this is a matter solely between the Government and its employee, whether or not the employee remains liable to the claimant.
The Government would appear to have a quasi-contractual right to recover reimbursement since payment of the judgment by the United States would discharge an obligas
tion primarily and principally due from the actual wrongdoer.'
The majority opinion states that while the legislative history of the Tort Claims Act
is not controlling, it shows a Congressional intent consistent with the instant decision.
The court supports its position by referring to testimony of then Assistant Attorney
General Shea contained in a Senate report made in 19421 ° in which ir. Shea states
that satisfaction of a claim against the Government was intended to bar any further
suit against the negligent employee, either by the claimant or the Government. The
20
court further asserts that Dalehite et al. v. United States makes it plain that Conand testimony. However,
reports
the
1942
relied
upon
gress, in passing the Act in 1946,

13. Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Contracts § 259 (1913).
14. Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928) ; Ohio Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Capolino, 65 N.E. 2d 287 (Ohio 1945) ; Smith et al. v. Foran, supra note 5; Georgia S. and
F. Ry. v. Jossey, 105 Ga. 271, 31 S.E. 179 (1898); 4 Williston on Contracts §1013 (1936).
15. See: The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 Yale LJ. 534, 559 (1947).
16. Anderson v. West Chicago Street Ry., 200 Ill. 329, 65 N.E. 717 (1902); Krolik v.
Curry et al., 148 fich. 214, 111 N.W. 761 (1907); Templeton v. Scudder, 16 N.J. Super.
576, 85 A. 2d 292 (1951) ; Betcher v. McChesney, 255 Pa. 394, 10D Atl. 124 (1917) ; cf. Jenkins
v. AtL C. Line R.R., 89 S.C. 408, 71 S.E. 1010 (1911).
17. There is some question as to whether judgment against an insolvent master constitutes
a bar to further action against the employee. See McNamara v. Chapman, 81 N.H. 169, 123
At]. 229 (1923).

18. See Campbell, Non-Consensual Suretyship, 45 Yale L.J. 69, 85 (1935).
19. Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and 6463, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942).
20. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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in United States v. Yellow Cab Company,21 the Supreme Court states that "The views
expressed in the earlier legislative history of this particular bill lose force by their
omission from the 1946 report and discussion." 22
It is true that in the Dalehite case the Court quotes language appearing not only in
the 1942 hearing and reports but in the House report of the Congress which adopted
the bill in question, thereby furnishing some support to the view that there was a continuity of Congressional intent. However, the statement quoted in the instant case 2 a
was not included or referred to in the 1946 reports or discussions.
The decision that the operation of Section 2676 of the Tort Claims Act precludes the
Government from an action of indemnity against the tort-feasor employee rests upon
an extremely broad interpretation of the statute. This section states only that judgment against the United States constitutes a bar to any further action by the claimant.
Its wording is unequivocal and there is nothing in the language of the remainder of the
statute to require reading into this section an extinction'of the Government's rights.
The majority's interpretation appears to be a direct violation of the well recognized
rule that ". . a statute will not be construed as taking away a common law right
existing at the date of its enactment, unless that result is imperatively required; . . . 24
Survival of such right must be so repugnant to the provisions of the statute as to
render them worthless. 25 Such is clearly not the situation in the instant case and the
Government's common law right of indemnity should not be destroyed.

TORTS-INFANTs--LiABILITY OF PARENT TO INFANT FOR INJURIES CAUSED By NEGLIGENCE OF PARENT.--Plaintiff, infant son of defendant, brought a tort action against his

father for injuries sustained in the latter's business allegedly due to the father's negligence. Defendant moved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground of insufficiency in
failing to state that plaintiff was emancipated. The Supreme Court, Special Term, denied
the motion, holding the fact that plaintiff was not emancipated would not preclude
recovery. Epstein et al. v. Epstein, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
The contention of the defendant that emancipation must be pleaded is based upon
Sorrentino v. Sorrentino,' and Cannon v. Cannon.2 However, the precise issue here
involved was not settled in those cases since the injuries there complained of arose out
of actions which occurred in the normal family activities. In the instant case the
injury was alleged to have occurred in the father's place of business because of the
father's negligent operation of that business and not because of any breach of a duty
the father owed his son simply as a father.
For the courts to find emancipation they must conclude that the child is really
21. 340 U.S. 543 (1951). In this case the Supreme Court held that there was no immunity
from Government suit for collection for claims for contribution due it from its joint tort
feasors. This is the decision most pertinent to the one at hand. However, the case did not
involve Section 2676 of the Tort Claims Act.
22. Id. at $50-551, n.8.
23. See note 19 supra.
24. Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1906) ; Shaw v.
R.R., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879) ; American District Telegraph Co. v. Kittelson et al., 179 F. 2d
946, 952 (8th Cir. 1950).
25. Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., supra note 24.
248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928).
2. 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236, 237 (1942).
1.
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economically independent
of the parents and that at least to some degree not account3
able for his actions.
The general rule denying an infant a cause of action against a parent unless the infant can show emancipation was first announced in a Mississippi case, Hewellett v.
George4 where a married female infant was denied a cause of action against her
mother, who had arbitrarily committed her to an insane asylum. The court found she
was not emancipated since she was separated from her husband and was living home at
the time of the commitment. A recovery was denied on grounds of public policy.G The
public policy precluding recovery was also adopted by New York in the Cannon0 case,
namely, to maintain domestic tranquility, not unduly to burden parenthood or encourage fraud or collusion among members of a family or to strain family resources vith
intra-mural lawsuits and generally to maintain parental discipline.
To show the rigidity with which this rule has been adhered to, there is the case of
a fifteen year old girl, criminally assaulted by her father, who was denied a cause
of action because of the court's fear of breaching the dike. 7 The decision seems to have
ignored the reasons for the rule, for it is difficult to perceive how a recovery could
have added to a lessening of parental discipline or domestic tranquility after such an
act by the father. However, this decision would probably not represent the law in New
York, since the court in the Cannon case indicated that the general rule of nonliability would not apply where the injury was due to the wilful, wanton misconduct
of the parent. 8 Accordingly, Meyer v. Ritterbush et al.,9 citing the Cannon case, sustained a cause of action in favor of the guardian of an infant son against the child's
mother, where it had been shown that she had asphyxiated herself and her son. Sinilarly, the sufficiency of the complaint of a three year old child against its parent was
upheld where the parent by the culpably negligent operation of an automobile had
occasioned serious brain injuries to the child.' 0
The doctrine of parental non-liability is further limited by the fact that it cannot be
raised as a defense where the infant sues in protection of its property rights. 1 '
The avowed purpose of preserving domestic tranquility was seemingly completely
ignored in a New York case where an unemancipated minor brother successfully maintained an action in negligence against his unemancipated sister, both of whom were
living in the same household. 12 The rights of husband and wife, as against each other,
are also determined independently of the problem of maintaining domestic tranquility; 13 either may sue or be sued by one another for tort, as though they were
strangers. In neither of these situations is the problem of domestic tranquility ac3. Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586, 587 (1948) (common law rule).
4.

68 I11iss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).

S. Id. at 706, 9 So. at 887.
6. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 428, 429, 40 N.E.2d 236, 237, 238 (1942).
7. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788, 7S9 (1905) 11... and, if it be once established that a child has a right to sue a parent for a tort, there is no practical line of dernarmtion which can be drawn, for the same principle which would allow the action in a case of a
heinous crime, like the one involved in this case, would allow an action to be brought for
any other tort."
8. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 429, 40 N.E.2d 236, 238 (1942).
9. 196 RMisc. 551, 92 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. CL 1949).
202 Misc. 1053, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. CL 1952).
l0. Siembab v. Siembab et al.,
11. Prosser on Torts 905 (1941).
12. Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939).
13. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 57.
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tually ignored, but rather, looked at more realistically, since equality of rights in law
is a strong encouragement to respect of those rights.
The present decision is merely a logical development of the trend to place the rule
in its proper perspective and carries the trend a step further. While the question of
limiting the rule, where the injury occurred when the parent was acting in a business
capacity, had not previously been decided in New York, there is ample authority in
other jurisdictions for giving the infant a cause of action either where the infant was
employed with the father or where the infant was in no business relationship with the
parent at the time of the accident but was injured by the parent while the latter was
acting in a business capacity as distinguished from a parental capacity. In Dunlap v.
Dunlap,' 4 plaintiff, defendant's sixteen year old son, worked during the summer for
his father, a contractor, under an arrangement whereby he was to receive the same
wages as the other workmen less a deduction for board. Plaintiff's name was listed on
defendant's payroll, and the father's premiums for employer's liability insurance were
computed on the basis of the payroll. The court found no compliance with the requisites which would amount to emancipation but nonetheless upheld the son's cause of
action. The father and the son were as strangers so far as the business was concerned. 6
Under the second and closely related situation a Virginia court in Worrell v. Worrell 16 gave an unemancipated female a cause of action against her father, a common
carrier who owned and operated the bus on which she was riding at the time of an
accident. In compliance with Virginia law he carried liability insurance and that fact
led the court to the conclusion that the state intended to protect the interests of all
passengers, irrespective of any incidental relationship between the owner or the operator and any one passenger.' 7 The court stated the guiding rule of this and similar
cases: "The parent is bound by the general obligation which the law imposes upon
everyone in his relations to his fellow-man." 18 That a common carrier relationship
need not be present is seen from the decision in an Ohio case, Signs v. Signs,'0 where
defendant father, engaged in motor transportation, maintained a gasoline pump on the
property of the plaintiff's mother. Plaintiff, a minor son, and other children were to
the knowledge of the defendant accustomed to playing near the pumps. The court
found the father to be negligent in leaving the pump unlocked and unguarded and in
giving no warning to his son or to the other children and the court attacked the logic
of a rule which would give the son's playmates a cause of action but would deny it to
the son,2 0 and which would give the son redress for damage to his bicycle, but not to
14. 84 N.H. 352, 150 AtI. 905 (1930).
15. Id. at 366, 150 Atl. at 912.
16. 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939).
17. "As a common carrier, he owed a fixed duty to persons occupying the status of
passengers. For the protection of such passengers, in the event of the violation of his duty,
the State required him to carry liability insurance. Can it be that his duties to other passengers are higher than his obligations to his own child, when his interest, her interest and the
interest of the State all require the preservation and protection of her rights?" Id. at 27, 4
S.E.2d at 349, 350.
18. Id. at 26, 27, 4 S.E.2d at 349.
19. 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
20. "In these modem times, . . . it would seem a fantastic anomaly that in a case where
two minor children were negligently injured in the operation of a business, one of them, a
stranger, could recover compensation for his injuries and the other one, a minor child of the
owner of the business, could not." Id. at 575, 576, 103 N.E.2d at 748.
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the rider for personal injury.21 Similarly in Borst v. Borst22 where a five year old
infant was run over by a truck driven by his father in the course of his business, the
court held the action was properly maintained. The fact that the accident happened
during a non-parental transaction was controlling.23 The court further was of the
opinion that the happening itself and not the resultant suit would be the cause of any
shattering of domestic tranquility. 24
The general rule of parental non-liability is sound where it is intended not unduly
to burden a parent in the exercise of legitimate discipline, or where another rule would
require a parent to run a home as though it were a factory, but this is not the case
where, as here, the injury occurs in the negligent operation of the parent's business.

oPr THE LAST Cr~m CH~cE.-Plaintiff's intestate
ToRTs-NEL1GFNcE-DocTr
died from injuries sustained when he was struck by a train in a subway tunnel at a point
almost midway between two stations. Upon first contact with the decedent the train
came to an emergency stop. The emergency equipment may be actuated in three ways:
by the blowing of a pneumatic valve, by a passenger pulling the emergency strap, or
by the operation of the automatic tripping device under each car indicating that something had come in contact therewith. Instead of investigating, the motorman reset the
brakes by pressing a button in his cab. Having proceeded about a car's length the train
came to another emergency stop. The motorman, again without investigating, repeated
his act of resetting the brakes. Again in approximately a cars length the train came to
its third emergency stop. An investigation then revealed the decedent's body wedged
between the running and third rails on the right side of the fourth car. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the
Trial Court which had granted defendant's motion for a new trial and had denied its
motions to dismiss the complaint and for a directed verdict and granted the defendant's
latter motions. On appeal, held, one judge dissenting, judgment reversed and a new
trial granted. The plaintiff had made out at least a prima facie case under the doctrine
of the last dear chance. Kumkumian v. City of New York, 305 N.Y. 167, 111 N.E.2d
865 (1953).
In most jurisdictions contributory negligence will preclude entirely the plaintiff's
recovery in a negligence action, but the plaintiff is not without a remedy if the defendant's conduct subsequent to his knowledge of the plaintiff's peril is the proximate
cause of the injury.' The authorities are divided on the question of limiting the ap21. "It seems absurd to say that it is legal and proper for an unemancipated child to
bring an action against his parent concerning the child's property rights, yet to be utterly
without redress with reference to injury to his person." Id. at 576, 103 N.E.2d at 748.
22. 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952), noted in 38 Cornell L.Q. 462 (1952).
23. "The reasons for the rule do not exist, and the mantle of immunity therefore disappears, where the tort is committed by the parent while dealing with the child in a nonparental
transaction." Id. at 657, 251 P.2d at 156.
24. "In the comparatively rare case where a child brings such an action, the likelihood
is that either the peace of the home has already been disturbed beyond repair, or that,
because of the existing circumstances, the suit will not disturb existing tranquility." Id. at
650, 251 P.2d at 153.
1. And to avoid liability there must be a reasonable effort to counteract the peril; and
the doctrine will not operate if the negligence of the two parties is contemporaneous. Panarese et al. v. Union Railway Co. of New York City, 261 N.Y. 233, 185 N.E. 84 (1933).
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plication of the doctrine of the last clear chance to cases wherein the defendant had
actual knowledge of the plaintiff's peril. Some allow a recovery where the defendant
should have known or discovered the plaintiff's peril although in fact he did not have
such knowledge. 2 As the case law on the doctrine has developed in New York, however, it has been held not to operate unless and until there is brought home to the
defendant a knowledge that another is in a state of peril. There is no liability even If
the defendant's failure to acquire the actual knowledge was due to his prior negligent
conduct.3 The defendant's behavior becomes of importance only after he is aware of
position of present peril and has sufficient time to avoid the impending
the plaintiff's
4
injury.
Two extensions of the foregoing doctrine have been suggested by the Court of
Appeals. In Woloszynowski v. New York Central RS.,5 Judge Cardozo wrote that
"there must be knowledge or negligence so reckless as to betoken an indifference to
knowledge." This reference to recklessness as an alternative which purportedly could
awaken the doctrine is obiter dictum and prior to the decision in the instant case had
not been resorted to by the Court of Appeals as a substitute for knowledge.0 The
second extension was seen in Chadwick v. City of New York. 7 Before that decision
knowledge of the plaintiff's peril was a requisite for the operation of the doctrine of
the last clear chance. In that case, two boys "hitched" a ride on a truck. One of the
boys had fallen partially off and was being dragged along, and the other, in his attempts
to attract the attention of the driver, pounded on the side of the truck and raised his
hand above the window. The driver admitted that he saw the hand. In finding for the
plaintiff the court said: "To a large degree the last clear chance doctrine necessarily
arises out of the circumstances subject to conflicting inferences and it may not be categorically stated that its [the doctrine's] applicability is limited to situations where
a defendant has precise knowledge of both the exact nature of the danger and of the
particular individual threatened so long as there is . . . an inference that someone is
in peril." 8
In the case under consideration, the Court of Appeals appears to have taken a further step. In reaching its decision the court suggested two alternatives. It held that
a jury was entitled to find that lack of knowledge on the part of the defendant's employees as to the decedent's position of danger came about as a result of their wilful
indifference to the emergency called to their attention by the automatic equipment,
and that it was a question of fact whether such conduct constituted "negligence so reck2. Prosser on Torts 412 (1941).
3. Panarese et al. v. Union Railway Co. of New York City, 261 N.Y. 233, 185 N.E. 84
(1933).
4. Ibid.
5. 254 N.Y. 206, 172 N.E. 471 (1930) (emphasis supplied).
6. Ignoring the dictum: Panarese et al. v. Union Railway Co. of New York City, 261
N.Y. 233, 185 N.E. 84 (1933); Storr v. New York Central R.R., 261 N.Y. 348, 185 N.E. 407
(1933); Hernandez v. Brooklyn and Queens Transit Corp., 284 N.Y. 535, 32 N.E. 2d 542
(1940). Referring to the dictum but placing emphasis upon actual knowledge: Elliott v. New
York Rapid Transit Corp., 293 N.Y. 145, 56 N.E. 2d 86 (1944); Dauphinee v. New York
Rapid Transit Corp., 290 N.Y. 683, 49 N.E. 2d 630 (1943). But see Kelly v. Murray, 257
App. Div. 863, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 696 (2d Dep't 1939), and Frey v. Long Island R.R., 272 App.
Div. 938, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 47 (2d Dep't 1947) where the Appellate Division approved, by way
of dictum, the dictum in the Woloszynowski case.
7. 301 N.Y. 176, 93 N.E. 2d 625 (1950).
8. Id. at 181, 93 N.E. 2d at 628.
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less as to betoken indifference to knowledge." 0 The court here appears to be adopting
as the law the dictum in the Woloszynowski case, and to be recognizing recklessness as
an adequate substitute for knowledge. As its second alternative the court further held
that it was likewise a question of fact whether the defendant's employees "ignored the
warning" as in the Chadwick case.10 But the defendant in the Chadwick case had actual
knowledge that someone was in peril when he ignored the warning." The operation of
the tripcock device in the instant case was not notice that the plaintiff or anyone else
was actually in peril. The automatic stops could have been due to a number of causes
and. occurring in the subway tunnel at a point almost midway between two stations,
were insufficient for a finding that the defendant's employees had actual knowledge
that someone was in peril.
The present decision appears, therefore, to extend liability under the doctrine of the
last dear chance to a situation wherein the defendant has merely received a warning
which would support the inference that someone might be in peril.
9. Kumkumian v. City of New York, 305 N.Y. 167, 175, 111 N.E. 2d 865, 869 (1953).
10. Ibid.
11. Chadwick v. City of New York, 301 N.Y. 176, 93 N.E. 2d 625 (1950).

